Sunday, March 20, 2011

AT&T buys T-Mobile USA: will the deal survive FCC scrutiny unscathed?

AT&T buys T-Mobile USA for $39bn, o/w $25bn in cash (may be raised by $4.2bn, as long as DT's stake is at least 5%) and $14bn in shares (for an 8% stake). The EUR equivalent is 28bn, of which EUR 13bn is for debt reduction (31%) and EUR 5bn for extra share buy-backs. The price implies a valuation of 7.1x adjusted 2010 EBITDA.

Deutsche Telekom further refers to its continued exposure to the US market and the attractive AT&T dividend. AT&T defends the deal by referring to the extra spectrum and the increased ability to blanket the US. They also refer to an 'impending spectrum exhaust'. And they are happy to report that T-Mobile USA will be 'part of a US-based company'. AT&T expects a synergy run-rate of >$3bn from 3 years after closing, total synergies will exceed the purchase price

Here are some first thoughts, some off of Twitter, for which a hat-tip to Dean, Keith and Brough:
  • What will DT do with the proceeds, i.e. the remaining EUR 10bn (locked up in AT&T stock for 1 year after closing)?
  • What does this imply for other markets, particularly those where DT offers mobile services only, such as the UK?
  • If 4G/LTE was a dealbreaker for T-Mobile USA, what does this imply for other companies still undecided on their 4G roadmap, such as E-Plus (KPN) in Germany?
  • Bad news for LightSquared, which is bound to lose a wholesale customer.
  • What will Sprint do?
  • How will the DoJ and FCC respond?
  • AT&T may have to give up spectrum.
  • If AT&T pulls this off, Verizon Wireless will be enabled to make further acquisitions as well. Which would be bad news for Vodafone: no long-awaited dividend re-installment.
  • What would the break-up fee be? - UPDATE: $3bn + some spectrum + a roaming deal.
  • Integration may lead to bad service for the next 12 months.
  • Competion will be reduced, the market may develop oligopolistic traits.

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Connected TV 2011 Conference, April 27, Utrecht

Our Connected TV 2011 conference is taking shape. Here is the latest speaker line-up, with some buzz words for what they will be speaking about:

Content, DRM, standards:
  • DLA Piper: DECE/UltraViolet
  • NPO: HbbTV
  • Chello DMC
  • Irdeto: ActiveCloak for Media
  • Reggefiber
End-to-end (back-office) systems:
  • Nokia Siemens Networks: Ubiquity Multiscreen TV Platform
  • Alcatel-Lucent: Mediaroom
  • Cisco: Videoscape
Client-side solutions:
  • Amino: Freedom, tier 1 euro telco
  • Technicolor: MediaEncore
  • Intel: Groveland
  • Aprico
Real-world cases:
  • Oregan: Onyx, Telefonica
  • Philips: Net TV
  • Wyplay: SFR, Vodafone Spain
  • Vodafone Spain

Where there's a cap, there's no competition

AT&T plans usage caps from May 2, 2011 for its DSL and U-verse subs: 150 or 250 GB/month, and an overage fee of 20c per GB. Similar policies are installed by Canadian ISPs (but with much more expensive overage fees), whereas BT is abolishing caps/FUP.

Dave Burstein was quick to point out that installing caps has little to do with cost (see previous post: The Incumbents' solution is in search of a problem). So which are the true reasons?
  • Make an extra buck. There's nothing wrong with that, except that AT&T is not being fair about why they are doing this.
  • Fight OTT. This write-up reveals that IPTV (U-verse) usage does not count toward the cap. By installing a cap, users may be led to think twice before using Netflix or Google TV. If you are used to leaving the TV on all day, this turns into a real problem.
  • Insufficient competition. In a competitive market, there would be little room for installing caps just to make an extra buck (see above). Put bluntly: caps prove that competition is insufficient.

Sunday, March 06, 2011

The Incumbents' solution is in search of a problem

Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom, Telecom Italia and Telefónica (hereafter The Incumbents) have issued a report called ‘A Viable Future Model for the Internet’. It reflects their well known stance on the “they are using my pipes for free” case, but it also offers a thorough review of options for how the Internet could be financed. O, and it was published by A.T. Kearney (which I hope earned a little bit less than 25 million Ozzie dollars for this report). While being a thorough report and an interesting read, there are some passages that we have a problem with. For inquires you can try to mail to incumbents@kearney.com.

First of all, here are the ‘structural problems’ that are perceived by The Incumbents:
  • ISPs (called Retail Connectivity Providers in the report) have not been able to monetize traffic growth. They are the victims of the very popular flat rate Internet. There is a disconnect between traffic growth and revenue growth. “… for growth to continue, the next few years must see a realignment of who captures the value and who funds investment in the Internet value chain” (page 1, a nice twist to Ed Whitacre’s above quote). It is also stated that “video traffic , much of it free to the end user” (page 1), while the end user pays a lot of money to his ISP.
  • OTT providers (called Online Service Providers in the report), who hardly contribute to the cost of the network, are not incentivized to use the Internet efficiently.
  • Network congestion is inevitable.
Second, the four possible remedies proposed:
  1. Raise retail prices.
  2. Introduce a data-conveyance charge for OTT providers.
  3. Enhanced quality services over the public Internet.
  4. Enhanced quality services based on bilateral agreements.
It becomes immediately clear from the above how The Incumbents position themselves in this issue. Fundamentally, they look upon OTT providers as publishers who have found an extremely cheap distribution platform, while The Incumbents pay for the networks. At the same time, OTT providers earn insane margins. The report also stands up for rights owners and speaks out against piracy, implicitly linking heavy usage to illegal file-sharing.

As the report discusses option #1, it finds an important objection against usage-based tariffs: “the problem is that end users often do not have full control or awareness of the actual traffic they are downloading. Software updates tend to download in the background automatically; animated adverts are not actively requested …” (page 26). This we agree with. Also, the writers think that price increases are not achievable, due to competition, and if they were, penetration and the uptake of new services could be negatively affected. This, we do not agree with.

As to option #2, the proposed charges are EUR 0.05 per GB for fixed and EUR 3.03 per GB for mobile networks. It is suggested that OTT providers could simply “… adjust their commercial models to cover the higher costs – doing so for example, with higher advertising fees or subscriptions ” (page 30). This is of course totally unrealistic: getting rid of the flat fee issue simply by pushing it to Google, saying that they should raise their rates. Check out Benoit’s post to see how this can’t work (or would they have their charges off by mistake by a factor of 10 or 100?).

Options 3 and 4 are about creating ‘Internet fast lanes’, or a ‘two-class Internet’, which has all sorts of net neutrality implications – which we do not need to replicate here.

Here are a few problems we have with the report:
  • The report is based on the assumption that congestion is inevitable. However, despite incredible growth, congestion hasn’t really been an issue yet. In other words, the solutions provided are in search of a problem. As Telegeography shows us periodically, capacity investments are ongoing and often outpace traffic growth. Also, the report appears to be sloppy in many places about which part of the Internet it focuses on: is it the long haul, the middle mile, backhaul or the access network?
  • A big deal is made out of using ‘the network’ efficiently, but if we are not mistaken, it becomes clear in just one place what this actually means: “Free video sites in general may find the conveyance charges are a strong incentive to develop more efficient traffic delivery (better compression techniques)”. So, one crucial and ‘structural problem’ is just about compression? Also, it seems entirely unconvincing that OTT providers would not care about compression.
  • The report fails to show that the linear value chain (figure 3) needs repair. In fact, it has served the Internet very well, with traffic flowing from left to right and money in the other direction. We also wonder why the Sony or the Philips analogy is not addressed, which so neatly nails the problem with solution #2 (above). (It must be acknowledged that the nature of OTT service provision weakens the analogy, because in the electricity world, there is no analogue to the OTT provider.) One could say that it is The Incumbents’ good right to try making OTT providers pay, but it would be at odds with how the Internet is organized today. Further, they could use their market power to bully these charges onto OTT providers, but that would appear to be sheer abuse of market power.
  • OTT providers (aggregators, not producers) pay a lot to distribute the content to servers all over the world.
  • OTT providers are described as the ones generating traffic ('traffic senders'), completely ignoring the fact that it is the end user who is in fact requesting the traffic. Put differently, without OTT providers, nobody would need a broadband connection in the first place. The Incumbents owe their entire (very lucrative) broadband income stream to the OTT providers.
  • Investors know that looking at margins alone doesn’t provide the whole picture. Some sectors are characterized by high margins, others by low margins. It depends on the nature of the business, which involves volumes as well.
  • The Incumbents are ignoring a minor detail: risk. For the non-investors: risk has nothing to do with our everyday-life use of the word; in investment theory, risk is about the standard deviation of returns. Just that, nothing more. Now take a look at Apple’s revenue growth and compare that to the extremely stable revenue profile of network operators. Remember further that The Incumbents are vertically integrated, with completely different risk/return profiles for the different layers (passive, active, services). Which is why there is increasing focus among newcomers on just one of the layers. OTT providers are no exception, even though they (Google in particular) do have extensive network assets.
  • If ISPs lack pricing power, sooner or later the market will sort this out. Many ISPs would be bound to go out of business. The fact that they don’t proves that broadband is still a high-margin (!) business. If ISPs complain about a disconnect between traffic growth and revenue growth, their natural response should be to raise prices, not turn around and look to the other end of the vale chain to extract money from.

Friday, March 04, 2011

Another worthless cable/DSL comparison

NLkabel, the Dutch cable lobby group, ordered a study from iPing Research into speed and pricing of cable versus ADSL. Of course, they claim that cable beats ADSL and that it is cheaper too.

On the face of it, it looks like a completely worthless exercise - which can be expected from a lobby group. This is where it goes wrong:
  • Cable and ADSL are compared. That should have been either Docsis x vs. xDSL (i.e. equipment), or HFC vs. copper (i.e. medium). And then there are differences in loop lengths to further complicate a solid comparison.
  • Broadband is available is speed tiers. What does 'average' mean? Exactly nothing.
  • When you look at actual speeds, it will be no surprise that people requiring the highest bandwidths take a cable subscription, because the fastest cable tier is faster than the fastest ADSL tier.
  • Current DSL research points to maximum speeds of 800+ Mb/s, beating any available Docsis 3 based offering. (Why not add a worthless claim ourselves, comparing lab conditions to actual offers?)
  • Why compare cable to ADSL and VDSL, while leaving out FTTH? Anyone?
  • Broadband is offered as part of a double or triple play, so pricing is not available in many cases.
Of course, NLkabel continues its fiber claims, while speed is mainly determined by bottlenecks (and they have a 300 meter bottleneck, not counting a handful of amplifiers). There is also a claim that 50-120 Mb/s over HFC is available to 98%, which is a fluid claim as well. Hell, 1 Gb/s is avaliable to 100% of the people - just need to do some digging!

I wouldn't be surpised if research shows that men drive their cars faster then women. I also wouldn't be surprised to see that men tend to buy BMWs, while women buy a Mercedes. But does that mean that a BMW is faster then a Mercedes? Or that 'the average BMW' is faster than 'the average Mercedes'?

Some people need a lesson in logic and reasoning.

Tuesday, March 01, 2011

PhotoRocket: the Facebook killer?

We are not fans of (the photo sharing site) Facebook. But what is a social network anyway, other than a set of personal homepages with communication between them? So why do we need a social network destination site at all?

This review of PhotoRocket may point the way in moving beyond traditional (2010 style) social networking. PhotoRocket is for sharing too, but it's not meant to be a destination site. It's simply an app. With some imagination, that could liberate us from advertiser traps such as Facebook.

Monday, January 24, 2011

Connected TV 2011: impressive speaker line-up forming

It looks like Connected TV 2011 will be an exciting event. So far, we have some very high-profile players make speaker commitments for this full-day, English-language, interactive event in Utrecht, on April 27:
I have also updated this post, containing links to all freely accessible Connected TV related commentaries.

To be sure about what Connected TV is (and what it is not: it's not IPTV, but rather IPTV 2.0 or TV-over-IP):

Consumer perspective:
  • More choice, content discovery
  • On demand
  • True interactivity of broadcast and broadband (not fake interactivity, such as interrupting live TV of VOD)
  • Second screen
Operator perspective:
  • Usage
  • Business model
  • Advertising
  • ARPU
  • Multi screen
  • Content rights
  • Cord cutting

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Why I am not on Facebook

Zadie Smith contributed an opinion piece in a local newspaper on Facebook. And I couldn't agree more. Meanwhile, greater fools are piling on. Here are her main points:






  • Software by nature isn't objective but reflects the intentions of its designer. Social networks reduce life/people to a database.
  • Social networking contact is by nature very shallow. Facebook encourages people to contact as many 'friends' as they possibly can.
  • Facebook encourages people to give up on their privacy. It encourages you to copy whatever your friends read, or watch, or eat.
  • It encourages people to 'like' as much as they can. Is there anything more stupid than the 'Like' button?
In short, it's all about making choices - not meaningful choices, but buying decisions. Every aspect is designed to aid advertisers to reach their dreamed-of demographic.

Facebook also reflects Mark Zuckerberg, from his favorite color (blue - he is red/green color blind) and 'poking' people (which is what people like he do) to trivia (the 'essence' of friendship).

You won't find Zadie on Facebook, but you will find her via email or Skype.

KPN: forward-integrated network or backward-integrated marketing?

Talking to a friend on the 'telecoms debt' side of the market, a relation between sewer-based FTTH and open access appeared.

There are two assumptions:
  • Telcos have a tendency or desire to become as vertically integrated as they possibly can.
  • There are basically two kinds of telcos: those focusing on networks, and those focusing on services.
Telcos focusing on networks start off by building passive networks. They then do forward integration, by adding active elements and finally may even end up providing services. Example: Reggefiber.

The other kind look at themselves as sales & marketing organisations. They do backward integration by adding active network elements (for control, higher margins) and may end up building passive networks, if the cost thereof is low enough. Example: Tele2. But in a way too: KPN.

The latter point (cost of passive networks) is precisely where sewer-based networks come into play. There's a start-up in the Netherlands that claims it can cut the cost of laying fibre in half. So my friend said: if they could somehow cut the cost in half yet again, building FTTH would become so cheap as to be justified by any sales & marketing driven telco. As a result, open networks would become a thing of the past. Obviously, the sewer poses some tough challenges, so it remains to be seen if this start-up will fly and build its own vertically integrated telco on top of its sewer-based network.

The other interesting question raised by this discussion is: what will Eelco Blok's new strategy be? He is taking over as KPN's CEO later this year, and the question he might want to answer is very fundamental: is KPN a netwok company, with forward integration, or a sales & marketing company with backward integration?

Wednesday, January 05, 2011

Pre-IPO considerations for Facebook, Twitter and Groupon

Silicon Valley valuations are going through the roof. Facebook is at $50bn, Groupon at $6.4bn and Twitter at $3.7bn. I wrote about it myself over here (subs only). For the non-investment souls amongst us, it is good to point out a number of extra considerations, esp. when reference to the Internet Bubble is made:
  • A $50bn value for a 6 year old company remains striking in any case. However, companies such as Facebook and Groupon are pretty healthy businesses, with solid revenue streams and presumably high margins. It must also be remembered that Google reached the $50bn valuation milestone after just a few years (not long after the IPO in 2004). Still, with sales of 'just a few billion', a $50bn valuation is a stretch.
  • Investing requires a rather short-term focus. After all, you can buy and sell stocks at the click of a mouse. As a result, trending is a very important quantity for investors, and is used in several different forms, both in technical analysis and in quantitative analysis. The consequence of all this is that a stock can be given a Buy recommendation, even if its valuation is sharp.
  • Investors with a longer-term focus must weigh the seemingly low entry barrier for social networks and daily deals sites, and the degree to which the company has been able to organise a network effect.
  • Monetisation is another thing to consider. Look at how this affects Twitter (still struggling to find a solid revenue stream) versus Facebook (the stupid Like button is a perfect advertiser tool). Twitter has about one third the number of users that Facebook has, but Facebook's value is more than 13 times Twitter's