Monday, July 10, 2023

A perfect storm is building for VodafoneZiggo - can management steer the company into calmer waters?

VodafoneZiggo is feeling the impact of high inflation and rising interest rates. It is safe to say that the company is over-leveraged, but does this mean that the company is at risk? Too much debt led to rescue operations in many previous occasions, including at KPN (twice!). When a perfect storm happens, even bankruptcy cannot be ruled out, as we have witnessed some 20 year+ years ago at UPC. Since Liberty Global and the Vodafone Group each hold 50% of the shares, it seems a far-fetched scenario for VodafoneZiggo (unless some financial engineering is developed and tax reasons come into play). For now however, the company will depend on autonomous growth to ease the pressure of its balance sheet.

Let's first look at what is happening under the hood:

  • The dividend will be roughly halved to around EUR 250 million over 2023E, as opex, tax and interest are rising dramatically. More potential costs are on the horizon and could wipe out the remainder of the dividend: sports rights (Eredivisie, UEFA), mobile (3.5 GHz band auction, network densification) and fixed (a very expensive Docsis 4.0 upgrade). At the same time, competitor KPN is looking to raise its pay-out to over EUR 1 billion annually (TBA at the Capital Market Days towards the end of the year).
  • Leverage is up and the cash position is at a historic low of just EUR 21 million (!) at 23Q1 - while no dividend was paid in the quarter. Interest cover is just 0.33. Operating free cash flow on a trailing twelve month basis is coming down from a peak of EUR 1.13 billion in 21Q1 to EUR 890 milllion in 23Q1. Net free cash flow (after interest and tax) is currently just EUR 140 million over twelve months, from a peak of EUR 650 million in 19Q1. There goes the source for paying out a dividend!
  • Liberty Global's CFO Charlie Bracken openly admits that VodafoneZiggo is over-leveraged. Net debt over trailing EBITDA currently stands at around 6.8x. He also recently halved his stock holdings in Liberty Global. This could be part of pre-existing plans but the timing is awkward, to say the least.

Here are some options and strengths the company has, but none of them is a walk in the park:

  • VodafoneZiggo rolled out gigabit broadband across its footprint and leads the broadband and fixed-line markets, but T-Mobile and Delta Fiber are starting to make inroads.
  • Price increases are taking effect, lastly 8.5% in fixed as of July 1st. However, it remains to be seen if this can drive overall revenue growth above 2%.
  • Shareholder pay-outs since incorporation (2017) total EUR 7 billion (this includes dividends and joint venture fees, but not interest on parent loans which totals around EUR 100 million per year). As stated above, the dividend pay-out is being reduced dramatically.
  • KPN could acquire Open Dutch Fiber, to ease the tension on the broadband market. VodafoneZiggo would welcome this but the regulator will open an antitrust investigation and may block such a move.
  • There is really just one big asset available for sale: the mobile tower sites. This could reduce debt by possibly up to EUR 1.5 billion. However, it will raise the opex and lower the EBITDA margin.

Furthermore, interest rates, inflation and other problems have led credit ratings institutes to lower the ratings and/or outlook for Sunrise, Tele Columbus, Altice France and others.

All this limits VodafoneZiggo's room to maneuver and make investments. Sure, the current dividend provides a buffer that can be eaten up, but:

  • Additional investments (content, mobile, fixed) are increasingly difficult to finance.
  • An IPO looks very difficult. The current enterprise value (equity value + net debt) equals the (adjusted) net debt, at most - based on a multiples comparison with KPN.
  • Acquiring Delta Fiber (which could carry an enterprise value of EUR 3 billion, according to a back-of-the-envelop calculation) seems hard. A transaction in stock seems out of the question, assuming the equity carries no value (see bullet above).

All in all, VodafoneZiggo is still a very cash-generative company, with strong positions in broadband and postpaid mobile. The problem is the cash-out, due to rising opex, tax and interest costs. Charlie Bracken stated that the group is "laying the foundations for future growth" for VodafoneZiggo. Given the above, this is hard to see happening in the current competitive and low-growth market, but it cannot be ruled out and may steer the company into calmer waters. Maximising sales while minimising costs is the simple recipe. Elements in this strategy that are missing so far are entering the fixed-line wholesale market (allowing the hollandsnieuwe brand to enter the fixed-line market would test the waters) and launching a cost reduction program.


Wednesday, April 19, 2023

Netflix 23Q1

Netflix 23Q1 results:

  • current AVOD tier ARM (subscr + ads) > Standard tier ARM, to expand features of AVOD tier (currently in 12 countries): 1080p, 2 streams (first in Canada, Spain)
  • to expand paid-sharing to US etc 23Q2 (delayed from late Q1), to block devices attempting access without properly paying (already in Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Canada, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain)
  • to close DVD-by-Mail 230929 (last day of shipping)
  • forecast 23Q2: paid net adds simialr to 23Q1, slight increase for forex-neutral ARM, rev $8.242b (+3.4%), oper inc $1.565b (margin 19.0%), net inc $1.283b (EPS $2.84)
  • targets 2023: rev growth to accelerate in H2, oper margin 18-20%, FCF $3.5b (raised from 3.0b on lower content spend), cash content to content amortization ratio closer to 1.0x, SBB to accelerate
  • target 2024: content spend $17b
  • long-term financial objectives unchanged: sustain double digit revenue growth, expand operating margin, deliver growing positive free cash flow, gross debt range $10-15b, maintain minimum cash equivalent to roughly 2 months of revenue


Thursday, April 13, 2023

Warner Bros Discovery announces Max, merged HBO Max / discovery+ SVOD service

Plans to launch Max SVOD service:

  • merged HBO Max & discovery+: HBO Originals, Warner Bros films, Max Originals, DC universe, Wizarding World of Harry Potter, kids content, factual (food, home, reality, lifestyle, docus from HGTV, Food Network, Discovery Channel, TLC, ID etc)
  • "unmatched in the breadth, reach, and excellence", "one seamless user experience that invites every member of the family"
  • 230523 in US, autumn 2023 in Latam, early 2024 in Europe, mid 2024 in APAC, new markets autumn 2024
  • 3 tiers:
    • Max Ad-Lite (10 $/mo or 100 $/yr; 2 streams, no downloads, 1080p, 5.1 sound)
    • Max Ad Free (16 $/mo or 150 $/yr; same but max 30 downloads, no more 4K UHD)
    • Max Ultimate Ad Free (20 $/mo or 200 $/yr; 4 streams, max 100 downloads, 4K UHD, Dolby Atmos)
  • current HBO Max subs keep same price, profiles automatically transferred, features (e.g. 4K, number of streams) to continue for 6 months after launch
  • discovery+ remains available stand-alone (incl some exclusive content), price unchanged (5 or 7 $/mo)
  • improved features: Premium Video Playback (cinematic), Personalization, More Prominent Kids Experience, Simplified Navigation
  • 4 key objectives: to drive more engagement, to enhance subscriber retention & reduce churn, to improve performance; to optimized monetization
  • content:
    • to add >40 new titles/seasons per month
    • orders series The Conjuring (movie spin-off), orders series A Knight of the Seven Kingdoms: The Hedge Knight (prequel to Game of Thrones), orders new spin-off series to Big Bang Theory; orders Harry Potter series (remake, decade-long)
  • launches campaign (tagline “The One to Watch”)
  • currently 50% of churn is involuntary (e.g. credit card expiration)
  • currently 7% of D2C subs have both HBO Max & discovery+
Comments:
  • Main points already leaked (name, pricing, content strategy); start-up losses will continue for some time; 2023 was to be the year of 'relaunching and building'
  • Aims to match Netflix, Disney+, Prime Video in terms of breadth; focuses on families; something for everyone at any time, any mood; leaves competitors (Paramount+, Peacock, Lionsgate, MGM) ever more behind
  • Dropping the iconic HBO brand is dubious (esp. in the US); also: focus on remakes, prequels, sequels and spin-offs foregos creativity and may not attract new subs (but it is good for the brand, carries low risk and allows additional monetisation through experiences at theme parks, such as new Harry Potter park in Abu Dhabi); adding discovery+ content is nice but may not attract new subs; the movie library grows at a slow pace (no direct-to-streaming titles), just 12 theatrical releases in 2023
  • Maintains pricing of HBO Max tiers but adds a superior tier at the high end; positive for ARPU; 4K no longer available for 16 USD/mo tier
  • Other:
    • FAST service yet to come; to keep live sports mainly on linear (in US), on Eurosport (Europe), Olympics deal with EBU
    • no more day & date, 12 theatrical releases in 2023
    • multiple new Lord of the Rings films
    • may sell RSNs, music rights (soundtracks) but no bidders
    • Moody's maintains Baa3 (lowest investment grade) on expected leverage decline to 4.25x YE 2024 (currently 5.0x)


Friday, March 31, 2023

Dutch 3.5 GHz band auction - main specs

The ministry launched its draft auction plan and consultation (until 11 May). Licenses valid from Dec. 1, so the auction is planned sometime between these dates.

The main specs:

  • Two phases, phase 1a (60 MHz licenses) simple multiple-round clock-auction with exit bids, phase 1b (10 Mhz licenses) same, phase 2 assignment (combinatory second price closed bid single round
  • Total reserve price EUR 176.1-257.1m (depending on number of 10 MHz licenses) + dues for assignment round; 3 licenses for 60 MHz each (reserve price EUR 40.7m), 12 (max 30) licenses for 10 MHz each (reserve price EUR 4.5m)
  • Valid until 401231 (17 yr + 1 mo from start at 231201)
  • Coverage obligations (from date of Inmarsat's vacation), 60 MHz licenses: 324 km^2 after 2 yr, 3216 km^2 after 5 yr, 10 MHz licenses: 54 km^2 after 2 yr, 536 km^2 after 5 yr
  • Caps: 40% ot total spectrum in all bands; 120 Mhz in 3.5 GHz band (50 MHz for bidders in round 1b only).


Thursday, February 16, 2023

Orange: new strategic plan 'Lead the future' for 2023-2025

Orange results 2022 & new strategic plan.

  • 22Q4:
    • Scale Up cost savings plan reaches EUR 700m cumulative indirect cost savings since 2019 (excl inflation EUR 1b)
    • Guidance 2023: EBITDA AL slight growth, ecapex strong decrease (15% of rev from 18% in 2022), organic CF (telecom) >= EUR 3.5b, leverage AL mid-term ~2x, dividend 72c
  • Launches new strategic plan Lead the Future:
    • 4 Pillars
      1. Generate value from core (FTTH, Data, AI, 5G, 4G Home, satellite in FR (with Eutelsat), merger Spain with MasMovil [Belgium with VOO]; to raise ARPO)
      2. Capitalise on infra (to add 5m fiber lines in Europe, 2m in MEA; RAN sharing; raise 3rd-party operator hosting rate from 1.37 to 1.5 by 2026 for TOTEM pylons; to decommission copper in FR and 2G/3G in Europe by 2030; to expand 4G & 5G in Africa; increase use of Data & AI; Network Integration Factories for automation & virtualisation)
      3. Transform OBS (accelerate growth in Enterprise, stgrengthen position in cybersecurity, OBS to rename as Orange Business, to be leader in next-gen connectivity solutions, plans far-reaching program of cost optimization to return to EBITDA AL growth by 2025 at the latest, Orange Cyberdefence rev 2025 EUR 1.3b)
      4. Growth in MEA (2020-2025 rev CAGR 7%, increased profitability; Orange Money (2022: 29m active users, EUR 100b in transactions) to expand beyond transfers & payments, also to non-subs)
    • 3 Guiding principles: performance, excellence, trust
    • ESG:
      • CO2 emissions -30% (scope 1, 2) by 2025 from 2015, -45% (scope 1, 2, 3) by 2030 from 2020, net zero carbon by 2040
      • Recycling to 30% by 2025 (currently 23.1%)
    • Business model transformation: simpler, faster, more efficient, agility, simplification of processes
    • Extends Scale Up cost savings program by additional EUR 600m by 2025 (on base of EUR 11.8b)
    • Targets 2025: EBITDA AL CAGR LSD, increased capex discipline, organic CF EUR 4b in 2025, leverage AL mid-term 2x, ROCE 2025 up from 2022 (to grow by 100-150 bp by 2025), dividend 75c over 2024


Wednesday, February 08, 2023

EC proposals on broadband development under SIngle Market

EC speech (230206, Helsinki)

  • 6G: Launches R&D project Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking (to lead the conception & standardisation of 6G)
  • Broadband:
    • Access regulation:
      • plans Broadband Cost Reduction Directive Feb 2023
      • plans Gigabit Recommendation (guidance for NRAs on how to use tools at their disposal to incentivise faster network deployment)
    • Operating models: proposes morphing telcos from connectivity providers to infrastructure-as-a-service providers
    • Fair share contribution (Internet Traffic Tax): plans consultation on "the future of connectivity and infrastructure": what is the infrastructure that Europe needs and how to timely mobilise investments? "raises the question of who pays for the next generation of connectivity infrastructure" (European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade already established that all market players benefiting from the digital transformation should make a fair & proportionate contribution to public goods, services & infrastructure)
    • Harmonisation, consolidation: how we can build a true Single Market for telecoms (curently based on business models based on national markets & high costs for national spectrum licenses), requires reflection on encouraging cross-border consolidation


OnePlus Cloud 11 launch event

OnePlus Cloud 11 launch event (New Delhi)

  • OnePlus 11 5G outside China (smartphone)
    • 6.7 inch, 5000 mAh, WiFi 7
    • 8 or 16 GB RAM, 128 or 256 GB storage
    • INR 57k or 62k; $700 or 800, EUR 830 or 900; GBP 730 or 800
  • OnePlus Pad (tablet)
    • 7:5 screen ratio, 11.6 inch, 2800x2000 pixels
    • MediaTek Dimensity 9000 chipset, 144 Hz refresh rate, Dolby Vision, Dolby Atmos, 4 speakers, 5G, 8 or 12 GB RAM, 128 GB storage, 9510 mAh battery
    • pre-orders from April 2023
    • with OnePlus Magnetic Keyboard, OnePlus Stylo, Case
  • Buds Pro 2 (earbuds)
    • INR 12k (India version 2R for INR 10k), $180, EUR 180, GBP 180
  • Keyboard 81 Pro


Monday, February 06, 2023

KPN 22Q4 details

KPN 22Q4 reporting, details:

  • 22Q4:
    • contributed EUR 23m to Getronics US pension plan (lowers annual contributions by EUR 7m for 3-4 yr)
    • price increase 5.8% on mobile (cap 2 EUR/mo, 221001), 3.5% for BB (220701) (increases depend on CLA wage increase (6% for 2023 = +EUR 45m))
    • upselling to higher speeds (50 Mb/s sunset, lowest in fixed now 100 Mb/s)
    • direct costs up (higher non-service rev (CPE), Glaspoort access costs, B2B SR mix change)
    • indirect costs down
    • personnel costs down (efficiency, attrition)
    • IT/TI down (digitisation)
    • other costs up (energy)
    • cost savings EUR 4m (incl one-off cost-of-living allowance for personal for high inflation)
    • total opex savings 2022 EUR 38m
    • Right-of-Use asset impairment EUR 16m on closing office The Hague
  • Outlook 2023:
    • adj EBITDA EUR 2.41b (EUR 5-10m higher than 2022; growth skewed to 23H2, yoy decline in 23Q1 on high comparison basis)
    • capex 1.2b
    • FCF 870m
    • div 15.0c (+4.9%)
    • new SBB EUR 300m (AGM 230412, ex 230414, payment 230419)
    • KPN Netwerk to report extended HP numbers (incl street presence) from 23Q1
    • accounting effect on consumer BB (rev sharing with SVOD) laps from 23Q2
    • LCE inflection during 23Q2
    • costs up on wage indexation (+EUR 45m), energy (+EUR 50-55m; 80% of total hedged, 20% spot market), inflation (impact on leases +EUR 10-20m)
    • FCF: higher cash taxes (+EUR 100m), WC improvement; FCF-to-Sales ~16% coming years
    • FTTP roll-out 2023 >600k (incl Glaspoort), currently 70% is HC
    • target energy consumption 2023 425-435 GW (2022: 455; 2021: 480 GW), target energy 2024 flat from 2023
    • target job cuts 2023 at least as 2022 (350)
  • Other
    • 2021 included an acquisition qualified as capex
    • Glaspoort (non-consolidated) reduces EBITDA (access costs will end once Glaspoort is consolidated) but adds minority interest (below EBITDA)
    • Considers fiber update analist meeting 2023


Monday, January 16, 2023

Proximus Capital Markets Day, strategy 2023-2025 'bold2025'

Proximus CMD: Strategic plan 2023-2025 bold2025 (press release, presentation)

6 PILLARS:

  1. Best gigabit network:
    • FTTH coverage 50% by 2025 (>3m HP with >1m HA = 45% of customers vs 55% on copper, 500k exclusive customers by 2025), 95% (6m HP) by 2032
    • Target copper-free by 2035, savings on power & maintenance max 120m EUR/annum, avoided renewal max 130m EUR/annum (together 250 EUR/annum), max 230m EUR/annum for upgrade)
    • Current copper-to-fiber migration 50% after 6 mo, market share gain 2 pp after 12 months; churn 30% lower, repair cost per customer 40% lower; fiber pricing 5-12 EUR/mo over copper, 30 EUR/mo over copper for 10 Gb/s tier, ARPC uplift 7 EUR/mo before promos (4 after)
    • Currently in >90 cities adding 600k lines/annum, current Unit Cost EUR 940, to grow to 950 post inflation & savings
    • New tech on fiber: quantum channel (for encryption), slicing (for gaming), digital twin (for monitoring), 25G-PON
    • 5G nationwide by 2025 (to apply slicing; 3G phase-out end 2024)
  2. Upgrade IT to support digital ecosystems (convergent solutions, shift to e-sales & e-servicing) and save costs (TCO reduction EUR 70m by 2025 in opex & capex)
  3. #thinkpossible culture, agile methods
  4. Inclusive society, protect environment (truly circular by 2030, net zero value chain by 2040), close the digital divide
  5. Best customer experience by 2025: digital-first, Picks (aggregator = asset-light with select exclusives), new Proximus+ service (TBA, target 1.8m active users by 2025) bundling daily services: telecoms, fintech (neobank), mobility (in 1 app), e-health (telemedicine), energy (innovation)
  6. Grow Proximus Domestic (fiber, multi-brand (Proximus (premium, family), Scarlet (value), Mobile Vikings (innovators, cord cutters)), FMC, ICT) & International (BICS, TeleSign)

TARGETS:

  • Domestic:
    • rev growth 2022 2%, 2023 1-3%
    • EBITDA 2022 +1%, 2023 -3% on inflation, EBITDA to grow from 2024, EBITDA 2025 to equal 2022
  • Group:
    • EBITDA 2022 +1%, 2023 -3%, EBITDA 2025 slightly higher than 2022
    • new cost (opex) savings plan EUR 220m over 3 yr (o/w 40% from workforce, 30% from IT, 30% from network/energy)
    • capex peaks in 2022 and 2023 at EUR 1.3b (fiber capex 20% on balance sheet, 80% off)
    • to divest non-strategic assets to raise EUR 400m (incl 143m from CHQ, rest from infra & property, excludes option to sell mobile towers and BICS, TeleSign)
    • dividend 2023 EUR 1.20, reduced to rebased level from 2024 and 2025 to EUR 0.60
    • to return to FCF growth from 2024
    • leverage 1.6x (excl. off-balance), as defined by S&P 2.3x (to 2.6 in 2023, 2.5-3.0x during 2022-2025)
  • International:
    • rev growth HSD, combined rev EUR 1.8b by 2025
    • direct margin CAGR 2022-2025 HSD


Thursday, January 12, 2023

Fair Share Contribution (aka Internet Traffic Tax) revisited - Big Telco vs. Big Tech

There are some problems with Big Telco's (ISPs) reasoning claiming that Big Tech (CAPs) should contribute their 'fair share' of broadband investments.

1. Net Neutrality

Applying the Internet Traffic Tax (ITT) to Big Tech only would violate Net Neutrality, meaning: it would create barriers to entry and growth for smaller and new CAPs, as Analysys Mason argues (and goes on to state that CAPs could have reduced incentives to invest in infrastructure, which would increase costs for ISPs, risk reduced quality of internet access, reduced ISP competition and ultimately higher fees for end-users).

By the way: what if the most popular services were not clustered at a handfull Big Tech companies, but instead were widely spread over hundreds or even more companies? What would the ITT then look like?

2. Fair is fair

Co-investment would necessarily lead to Big Tech taking an equity stake in a series of infrastructure joint-ventures with Big Telco.

Unless it would indeed be a tax, from which a European Broadband Fund would be funded, but that would alter the Big Telco proposal entirely.

Conversely, if Big Tech should share in the cost of access networks, then Big Telco should share in the cost of developing services and content.

Indeed, the EU appears to be signalling that the cost of for instance the metaverse and the cloud (incl. subsea cable systems and datacenters) should be considered - areas where Big Tech's investments dwarf those of Big Telco.

3. If it ain't broke, don't fix it

Increased data traffic leads to increased network costs and investments. This is a natural consequence of Big Tech services leading to the creation of the (large, growing and very profitable) Broadband Market in the first place. However, over the past few years Big Telco margins have only expanded, as the cost per bit has been coming down.

Peering and local caching (such as Netflix's free Open Connect CDN) only help towards this. The system, based on good old market forces, works fine. Some, such as DT and SKT, resist Open Connect, leading to more expensive transit (in the case of SKT: to Hong Kong and Tokyo), deteriorating the user experience.

4. Two-sided business model

Big Telco can't be forced to adopt a network vision including peering, local caching, transport (incl. subsea) and hosting (datacenters) and appears to be more interested in creating a two-sided business model based on Sending Party Network Pays (SPNP), as ETNO proposes (and BEREC opposed). Even if the former (peering and caching) provides Big Telco with large savings, as Analysys Mason shows. SPNP carries the risk of giving Big Telco monopoly power in termination, as Euro-IX argues.

Big Telco owns the billing relation with the end-user. If it has insufficient pricing power to raise prices, then this implies that not all Telcos agree with Big Telco's argument. Also, why not switch from unmetered to metered (volume-based) tiers? And remeber: manufacturers of electronic products never contributed to the cost of the electricity grid.